Bethel University

Spark
Biblical and Theological Studies Faculty Works

Biblical and Theological Studies Department

2020

Alvin Plantinga: Christian Philosophy as Apologetics
James K. Beilby
Bethel University, james-beilby@bethel.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://spark.bethel.edu/bible-theology-faculty
Part of the History of Christianity Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of
Religion Commons

Recommended Citation
Beilby, James K., "Alvin Plantinga: Christian Philosophy as Apologetics" (2020). Biblical and Theological
Studies Faculty Works. 39.
https://spark.bethel.edu/bible-theology-faculty/39

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Biblical and Theological Studies Department
at Spark. It has been accepted for inclusion in Biblical and Theological Studies Faculty Works by an authorized
administrator of Spark. For more information, please contact kent-gerber@bethel.edu.

Alvin Plantinga: Christian Philosophy as Apologetics
Jim Beilby
Alvin Plantinga (1932– )
Alvin Plantinga (b. November 15, 1932) is a contemporary philosopher of religion working in the analytic tradition
of philosophy whose contributions in the fields of metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of religion have been
nothing short of groundbreaking. He is the author of 17 books and well over 150 articles and essays; he is the past
president of the American Philosophical Association and the Society of Christian Philosophers, a Guggenheim
fellow, a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and he has been awarded a number of prestigious
lectureships, including two Gifford Lectures (University of Aberdeen), the Wilde Lectures (Oxford University), and
the Suarez Lecture (Fordham University). He has been granted honorary degrees from Valparaiso University, the
Free University of Amsterdam, Brigham Young University, North Park College, and the University of Glasgow, and
Calvin College named him a Distinguished Alumnus in 1986. Finally, and most recently, he is the 2017 Templeton
Prize Laureate.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Plantinga was born in Ann Arbor, Michigan into a Dutch Reformed family that took their
faith and education very seriously.1 After being introduced to Plato by his father, Plantinga
decided that he wanted to be a philosopher and to that end, he enrolled at Calvin College in the
Spring of 1950. During his first semester, Plantinga applied for and was given a substantial
scholarship to attend Harvard, so in the fall of 1950 he made the trip east. While not lengthy,
Plantinga’s time at Harvard was impactful for a pair of reasons. First, he encountered serious and
thoughtful non-Christians for the first time and recounts being struck by “the enormous diversity
of opinions about [religious] matters, some of them held by highly intelligent and accomplished
people who had little but contempt for what I believed.”2 These contrary opinions caused him to
evaluate and question his own beliefs, but as he did so he began to wonder whether the
objections to traditional Christian belief that were taken for granted by many of his peers had the

For greater detail on Plantinga’s upbringing and academic training see his two autobiographical essays (“SelfProfile” in Alvin Plantinga, eds., James Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen ([Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985] 3-97 and
“A Christian Life Partly Lived,” in Philosophers Who Believe: The Spiritual Journeys of 11 Leading Thinkers, ed.
Kelly James Clark [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1993] 47) and James Beilby, Epistemology as Theology
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) 3-32.
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substance they appeared to have on the surface. Second, one evening, on his way back to his
dorm, Plantinga had a profound religious experience that has greatly affected his approach to
belief in God ever since. “Suddenly it was as if the heavens opened; I heard, so it seemed, music
of overwhelming power and grandeur and sweetness; there was light of unimaginable splendor
and beauty; it seemed I could see into heaven itself; and I suddenly saw or perhaps felt with great
clarity and persuasion and conviction that the Lord was really there and was all that I thought.”3
Compared to this experience, the arguments for and against God’s existence seemed “merely
academic, of little existential concern.”4 While Plantinga greatly appreciated his time at Harvard,
a trip home to visit his parents during the Spring of 1951 changed his plans. While home, he
visited the class of William Jellema. Plantinga loved Jellema’s teaching and was particularly
impressed with the way he engaged objections to Christianity and as a result, Plantinga
transferred from Harvard back to Calvin.
Following his graduation from Calvin, Plantinga completed an M.A. at Michigan under
William Alston and a Ph.D. at Yale under Paul Weiss and Brand Blanshard. His first teaching
job at Wayne State University was academically fruitful, largely due to the interaction of his
departmental colleagues — Plantinga characterized the philosophy department at Wayne State as
“less of a philosophy department than a loosely organized but extremely intense discussion
society.”5 Despite the fertile intellectual soil at Wayne State, in 1963 Plantinga accepted an offer
to replace Harry Jellema at Calvin. The reasons behind such a move were not apparent to some
of his colleagues, but were undoubtedly very similar to the reasons Plantinga decided to leave
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Harvard for Calvin College — namely, his desire to do philosophy in community with those who
shared his theistic and theological commitments. Plantinga flourished at Calvin for nineteen
years, however, in 1982, he surprised many by accepting a position at the University of Notre
Dame as the John A. O’Brien professor of philosophy. His move to Notre Dame allowed him to
teach high quality Ph.D. students and share with them some of what he had learned about
philosophical theology and doing philosophy as a Christian, and thus profoundly influence the
next generation of students. He retired from Notre Dame in 2010, and to the surprise of nobody
who knows him, Plantinga returned to Calvin as the inaugural holder of the William Harry
Jellema Chair of Christian Philosophy.
THEOLOGICAL CONTEXT
Plantinga’s apologetic work has been influenced by two significant contextual factors.
The first was the widespread anti-religious and anti-theistic demeanor in the academic world and
particularly in philosophical circles in the 1950s and 60s. Not only were there were relatively
few Christians doing philosophy in the 1950s, those philosophers that were Christians tended to
avoid religious and theological topics in order to avoid being marginalized. Moreover, there was
a widespread (even if poorly argued for) belief that the very idea of religious and metaphysical
inquiry was of minimal use, or perhaps, fundamentally incoherent. As such, Plantinga’s early
philosophical training took place during, as he describes it, “the positivistic heyday of antimetaphysical animus.”6 The influence of this anti-theistic context can be seen most clearly in his
description of his time at Wayne State University. While at Wayne State, Plantinga’s colleagues
(Hector Castaňeda, Edmund Gettier, and George Nakhnikian especially) confronted Plantinga
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“with antitheistic arguments of a depth and philosophical sophistication and persistence [he] had
never encountered before.”7 Being forced to deal with antitheistic arguments of such a level and
caliber was, according to Plantinga, “a great stimulus to rigor and penetration in my own work,”8
nevertheless, he suggests that it had another, less positive impact:
I was never able to get beyond a sort of defensive posture. I concentrated on arguing
(contrary to my colleague’s claims) that theism was not wholly irrational. . . . I often felt
beleaguered and, with respect to my Christianity, alone, isolated, nonstandard, a bit
peculiar or weird, a somewhat strange specimen in which my colleagues displayed an
interest that was friendly, and for the most part uncensorious, but also incredulous and
uncomprehending. It wasn’t that this atmosphere induced doubt about the central
elements of Christianity; it was more that my philosophical horizons were heavily formed
by my colleagues and friends at Wayne.9
Given this environment, Plantinga’s interest in apologetics was strengthened, but his apologetic
methodology was formed in a highly defensive, minimalist direction.
The second contextual factor influencing Plantinga’s apologetics is Calvin College, a
place he calls “the major intellectual influence in my life.”10 The impact of the community of
Calvin College on Plantinga is undoubtedly complex and varied,11 but two broad lines of
influence seem particularly important. First, and most generally, Calvin provided a fertile
community for the development of a full-orbed way of looking at the world as a Christian and
understanding the task and nature of Christian scholarship. In Plantinga’s own words:
I thought of scholarship in general and philosophy in particular as in large part a
communal enterprise: promising insights, interesting connections, subtle difficulties—
7
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While Calvin College’s influence on Plantinga is significant, it would be a mistake to infer that Plantinga is
unequivocally theologically Calvinistic. His soteriology, for instance, is Arminian. Moreover, as an elder in the
Christian Reformed Church, he signed the Belgic and Heidelberg Confessions, but not the Canons of Dordt
(personal correspondence).
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these come more easily and rapidly in a group of like-minded people than for the solitary
thinker. The topics I most wanted to work on were the topics I’d been introduced to in
college: the connection between Christian faith and philosophy (as well as the other
disciplines) and the question of how best to be a Christian in philosophy.12
At Calvin, starting in 1964, “communal philosophical work” came in the form of the
Tuesday colloquium, the most helpful members of which were Peter de Vos, Kenneth
Konyndyk, Del Ratzsch, and Nicholas Wolterstorff.13 A second, more specific line of influence
of Calvin on Plantinga can be discerned. In all of his academic interaction at Calvin, from his
first class with Jellema to his discussion with his colleagues in the philosophy department, the
idea that there is no such thing as a “serious, substantial and relatively complete intellectual
endeavor that is religiously neutral” was continually emphasized.14 This mindset gave
Plantinga’s apologetic work an independence that powerfully shaped both the content of his
arguments and his apologetic methodology.
APOLOGETIC METHODOLOGY
In describing his work, Plantinga has said:
One of my chief interests over the years has been in philosophical theology and
apologetics: the attempt to defend Christianity (or, more broadly, theism) against various
sorts of attacks brought against it. . . . I can scarcely remember a time when I wasn’t
aware of and interested in objections to Christianity and arguments against it.15
His contribution to apologetics has spawned what many people view as a new apologetic
methodology: Reformed Epistemology.16 However, labeling Reformed Epistemology as a
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Grove: InterVarsity Academic, 2015).
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distinct apologetic methodology is complicated. It seems better to say that Reformed
Epistemology is not a distinct apologetic method, but rather that it has a number of important
implications for apologetics, for the nature of Christian philosophy, and for the task of religious
epistemology, and that those implications are crucially important for apologetics because they
are a way of thinking about how religious beliefs are (and should be) related to arguments,
evidence, and counter-evidence.17 But these insights are not only usable within a single
apologetic methodology; even evidentialists could adopt at least some of the assertions of
Reformed Epistemology.
Even if Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology is not best thought of as a distinct apologetic
methodology, it certainly involves a set of assertions that are enormously important from an
apologetic point of view. The first of these concerns the nature of Christian philosophy, and
Christian scholarship in general. Plantinga’s work expresses the conviction that theists and
nontheists have fundamental differences in their approach to important philosophical questions.
What sorts of beliefs are possible objects of knowledge? Are there “truths” that are, by
definition, beyond the ken of human beings? One’s answer to these questions will be affected by
many things: whether or not you think reality is solely materialistic, what sort of beings you
think humans are, what kind of cognitive faculties they have, and what sorts of beliefs are
properly thought of as arising from those cognitive faculties. And one’s answer to these
questions will affect their appraisal of what counts as a suitable explanation of a given range of
facts. Of course, philosophy is more than just expressing in philosophical form the content of

Nicholas Wolterstorff refers to Al’s work as addressing the “epistemology of philosophy.” See his “Then, Now,
and Al,” in Reason, Metaphysics, and Mind: New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga, eds., Kelly James
Clark and Michael Rea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 213.
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one’s theological convictions. The point is, rather, that one’s philosophy is shaped by one’s
theological convictions, or by the lack of such — how you approach philosophy, what questions
you think are worth answering and what sorts of answers you deem to be adequate are all
affected by your stance toward religious matters. Consequently, while Plantinga would
vehemently reject the idea that theists and nontheists cannot engage in discussion on
philosophical matters, he repeatedly avers that there is no real neutral territory from which these
conversations can proceed. This is the main message of his “Advice to Christian Philosophers.”18
In this address, Plantinga issued a clarion call for Christian philosophers to not be content with
reactionary philosophical sparring with the unbelieving academic majority and to cease to allow
non-Christian and non-theistic assumptions to set the parameters and boundaries of their
philosophical work, but instead to feel free to explore the questions that motivate and interest
Christians, regardless of whether or not the secular world finds those questions interesting,
valuable, or even sensible.
Second, Reformed Epistemology involves the rejection of the evidentialist requirement
for belief in God. The evidentialist requirement is, stated simply, the idea that belief in God
requires propositional arguments — like the theistic arguments produced by natural theology —
if it is to have positive epistemic status (rationality, justification, warrant, etc.). Plantinga argues
that the evidentialist requirement is flawed in a number of respects (more on this in §4C, below)
and that instead belief in God can be properly basic — it can be fully rational, justified, and
warranted even if a person does not know of any good arguments for the existence of God. In
other words, the epistemic status of belief in God can be similar to that of my memory belief that
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I had breakfast this morning or my perceptual belief that a steaming cup of coffee is on the table
next to my laptop, both of which are held in the absence of propositional evidence. This claim is
called the “parity thesis” and is one of the enduring aspects of Plantinga’s Reformed
Epistemology.
While Plantinga does not believe that theistic arguments are necessary for grounding
religious knowledge, that does not mean that he thinks that such arguments are pointless. In fact,
Plantinga has written a paper titled “2 Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments.”19 These arguments
might have a variety of benefits, including increasing the warrant a Christian has for their
religious beliefs,20 but they do not successfully establish the truth of beliefs about God.
I don’t know how to do something one could sensibly call “showing” that either [theism
and Christianity] is true. I believe that there are a large number (at least a couple dozen)
good arguments for the existence of God; none, however, can really be thought of as a
showing or demonstration. . . . Of course, this is nothing against either their truth or
warrant; very little of what we believe can be ”demonstrated” or “shown.”21
Instead of grounding the positive epistemic status of Christian belief on propositional
arguments, Plantinga argues for an experiential grounding paralleling my perfectly justified
belief that I see a cup of coffee on the table. As such, if we simplify apologetic methodologies
down to three: evidential, experiential, and presuppositional, Plantinga’s Reformed
Epistemology is on the experiential/presuppositional wings of the apologetic enterprise.22
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First developed in 1986 and circulated for many years as a handout. It was finally published as an appendix in
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CONTRIBUTIONS to the FIELD of APOLOGETICS
Plantinga is a philosopher par excellence, but his philosophical work has ultimately
served a theological or apologetic purpose. In the broadest possible terms, Plantinga’s apologetic
efforts can be described as the attempt to excavate important philosophical issues and expose the
philosophical assumptions that sit poorly with or run contrary to the Christian worldview. In fact,
a single conceptual strand can be traced through the whole of Plantinga’s work, which may be
summarized as follows: “There is no plausible objection, set of objections, or epistemological
theory that rules out theistic belief as a category of epistemically appropriate belief.” Plantinga
has developed this claim in a number of significant ways; I will discuss four specific
contributions and close with a brief discussion of Plantinga’s broad impact on Christian
apologetics.
Religious Language
As discussed above, Plantinga began his philosophical career during a time of hostility
towards “Christian” philosophy. Logical Positivism had a firm grip on many quarters of the
western philosophical world and their proposed way to think about language, the Verification
Theory of Meaning, was widely influential. On this theory, a statement (or proposition) is
meaningful if and only if it is empirically verifiable. By the lights of Logical Positivists,
statements like “God loves me” couldn’t even be described as false, they were assertorically
meaningless. And even in places where Positivism was not entrenched (like Yale, where
Plantinga did his Ph.D.), the philosophy of religion focused on God-talk, not on God. Plantinga’s
book, God and Other Minds, was a radical affront to this entire approach to religious language.
Not only did he argue that Verificationism was self-referentially incoherent — after all, the
statement “a proposition is meaningful only if it is empirically verifiable” isn’t obviously

9

empirically verifiable itself — he unapologetically talked about God and assumed that statements
could meaningfully refer to God.23 As a result (although undoubtedly with the help of others),
Logical Positivism and Verificationism “has retreated into the obscurity it so richly deserves.”24
Moreover, the philosophical world was provided a stunning example of what philosophy of
religion could look like when it was not shackled by the fashionable but implausible strictures on
what religious statements could and could not do.
Problem of Evil
Arguably, in apologetic circles, Plantinga is best known for his response to the problem
of evil. His Free Will Defense is a response to the Logical Problem of evil as typified by J. L.
Mackie’s 1955 article, “Evil and Omnipotence” which claims that the co-existence of an allpowerful, perfectly good God and evil is a logical contradiction.25 While Christians, going back
at least to the early-Augustine,26 have sought to answer the problem of evil with reference to the
free choices of human beings, the difficulty for such a response to Mackie’s argument comes in
explaining why an all-powerful God could not create persons that always freely choose the good.
And this difficulty raises a series of thorny metaphysical questions about the nature of necessity
(what must be) and possibility (what might be). The anti-metaphysical philosophical climate in
the 1950s and 60s, however, did not provide a robust understanding of these concepts. In
response, Plantinga gave the concepts of necessity and possibility sustained attention,27 resulting

Wolterstorff’s story about the impact of God and Other Minds is powerful and instructive (“Then, Now, and Al,”
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See his On Free Will, book 1, xvi, 34 and Confessions, VII, 5.
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There were, of course, others engaging these questions, most notably, Saul Kripke. See his Naming and Necessity
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).
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in his ground-breaking book, The Nature of Necessity.28 The understanding of modality in this
volume gave him the tools necessary to articulate his Free Will Defense — an argument that
utilizes possible worlds semantics, a Molinist account of God’s foreknowledge, and a Libertarian
account of freedom to answer the logical problem of evil.29 The central insight of the Free Will
Defense is that while there may be many possible worlds which have a better overall balance of
good as compared to evil, because of the existence of significantly free creatures in at least some
of those worlds, it is possible that even an omnipotent being could not create (or actualize) any of
them. Plantinga’s Free Will Defense thus answers the objection that God’s existence is logically
incompatible with the existence of evil.
While some continue to argue that the Logical Problem of Evil is unscathed (or
somewhat less than fully scathed) by Plantinga’s argument, the vast majority have accepted
Plantinga’s argument as successful. In the words of Richard Gale (who is not a theist), “it is
generally conceded that the logical challenge of evil has been successfully neutralized by
Plantinga and his cohorts.”30 Perhaps the best evidence for the success of Plantinga’s Free Will
Defense is that since the publication of his argument, the vast majority of atheists who advance
the problem of evil have shifted to the evidential problem of evil — evil is merely claimed to be
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evidence against God’s existence, it does not render God’s existence logically impossible.31
Religious Epistemology
Other than his Free Will Defense, Plantinga is best known in apologetic circles for his
work on religious epistemology. His first contribution came in God and Other Minds (1967)
where he argues that there are a set of beliefs that we are strongly inclined to accept as
epistemically appropriate — the paradigm example of which is belief in the existence of other
minds — for which compelling arguments or evidence is lacking. Since some of what we
rationally believe, and even know, is held in the absence of propositional evidence or arguments
— in fact, in the absence of any clear idea of how to go about building an argument for such
things — then what is wrong with the Christians treating their religious beliefs in a similar
fashion? His controversial conclusion: “if my belief in other minds is rational, so is my belief in
God. But obviously the former is rational; so, therefore, is the latter.”32 God and Other Minds set
the basic direction of Plantinga’s religious epistemology in two fundamental respects: religious
beliefs enjoy epistemic parity with other widely accepted beliefs (such as belief in other minds)
and, like those beliefs, it does not require propositional evidence to be epistemically acceptable.
In the early 1980s, a flurry of articles and essays extended Plantinga’s basic argument in
God and Other Minds, the longest of which was “Reason and Belief in God.”33 In these works,

Plantinga has also written on the evidential problem of evil. For example, see his “On Being Evidentially
Challenged” in The Evidential Argument from Evil, ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder, 244-261 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1996) and “Degenerate Evidence and Rowe’s New Evidential Argument From Evil” Noûs 32/4
(1998) 531-544.
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Belief, ed. C. F. Delaney, 7-27 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979); “Reformed Objection to
Natural Theology, ” in Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 54, Philosophical
Knowledge, eds., John B. Brough, Donald O. Dahlstrom, Henry B. Veatch, 49-62 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic
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Plantinga returned to the argument originally laid out in God and Other Minds, that belief in God
could be entirely rational even in the absence of propositional evidence. To bolster this claim,
Plantinga sought to show that evidentialism — the supposition that beliefs require propositional
evidence (usually given in the form of an argument) to be rational — was rooted in Classical
Foundationalism and that Classical Foundationalism was untenable in that it was selfreferentially incoherent. In the late 1980’s, Plantinga published a series of works on
epistemology and religious epistemology that signaled a transition in his approach to religious
epistemology. Rather than merely defending the rationality or justification of religious belief,
Plantinga asked a pair of prior questions: What is the nature of rationality or justification? And
what is it that converts merely true beliefs into knowledge? “Justification and Theism” (1987)
was Plantinga’s first step on this journey.34 In this article, he outlined the structure of his new
approach to religious epistemology. Central to this approach was the notion of proper function;
belief in God according to Plantinga could count as knowledge if it was produced by properly
functioning cognitive faculties. This approach represented a fundamental step away from his
previous approach to epistemological questions. Before, Plantinga had discussed rationality and
justification as deontological notions, involving the keeping of one’s epistemic duties. In
Plantinga’s new account, however, the concept of epistemic duties takes a back seat to the
reliability of one’s belief-producing mechanisms. Plantinga developed this account of
epistemology in a series of articles and most decisively in his Warrant trilogy: Warrant: The
Current Debate (1993), where he critiqued the reigning epistemologies; Warrant and Proper

University of America, 1980); and “Is Belief in God Properly Basic?” Noûs 15 (1981) 41-51.
34

Faith and Philosophy 4 (October 1987) 403-426.
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Function (1993), where he laid out the details of his own theory of knowledge; and Warranted
Christian Belief (2000), where he applies his account of knowledge to belief in God.35
In Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga identifies two categories of objections to belief
in God, the de facto objection and the de jure objection. A de facto objection is an objection to
the truth of Christian belief and a de jure objection involves the claim that Christian belief is
flawed epistemically. In other words, a de jure objection is that even if it is true that God exists,
there is not sufficient evidence, arguments, grounds, or reasons for a person to be rational,
justified, or warranted in their belief that God does exist. Plantinga develops two claims in
Warranted Christian Belief. First, Plantinga argues that de jure objections are not independent of
de facto concerns — that is, whether religious belief is warranted or not depends crucially on
whether God, in fact, exists and has created humans with a capacity for knowledge of him.
Second, Plantinga offers a way Christians might think about the warrant of their religious beliefs.
Warranted Christian beliefs, according to Plantinga, are not produced by humanity’s original
cognitive equipment, rather “they come instead by way of the work of the Holy Spirit, who gets
us to accept, causes us to believe, these great truths of the gospel. These beliefs don’t come by
way of the normal operation of our noetic faculties; they are a supernatural gift.”36 These beliefs
are produced in humans in a way that meets Plantinga’s conditions for warrant — they are a
product of a belief-producing process that is functioning properly in an appropriate cognitive
environment (the one for which they were designed), according to a design plan successfully
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All three books of the Warrant trilogy were published by Oxford University Press. Recently, Plantinga has
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aimed at the production of true beliefs.37
While not all Christians will accept Plantinga’s understanding of warrant or all of the
details of his model of the warrant of Christian belief, from an apologetic point of view,
Plantinga’s religious epistemology is significant in two respects: he describes a way in which
Christian belief could have warrant, thus invalidating the claim that Christian beliefs cannot
possess positive epistemic status, and he shows that atheists cannot simply advance de jure
objections to Christian belief, they must argue that Christian belief is not true (a much more
difficult task).
Science and Naturalism
Plantinga’s consideration of the relationship between science and religious belief has
produced a pair of apologetic contributions, his argument against methodological naturalism and
his Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. Methodological naturalism, as Plantinga defines
it, is “the idea that science, properly so-called, cannot involve religious belief or commitment.”38
It’s not that a Christian cannot do science, but rather that as they do science, they must not allow
their religious beliefs to affect the content of their scientific work. Plantinga’s ruminations on
methodological naturalism are directly connected to his perspective on the nature of scholarship
and flow from his commitment to the idea that there is no reasonably complete important
academic work that is religiously neutral. A Christian might want to see how a scientific question
could be answered if they bracketed their religious beliefs, but — and this is Plantinga’s main
point — why should they have to? He says: “Isn’t it perverse to limit yourself to only some of
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what you know, or only some sources of knowledge, if your aim is to reach the truth about the
phenomenon in question?”39 Instead, Christians should feel free to take into account all they
know as they engage in science and in scholarship in general.
While Plantinga’s apologetic career has been characterized by an emphasis on negative
apologetics, in the final chapter of Warrant and Proper Function, Plantinga offers a bold and
controversial piece of positive apologetics in the form of an argument against naturalism.40
Plantinga argues that the conjunction of metaphysical naturalism (the view that only natural
objects, kinds, and properties are real) and contemporary evolutionary theory is self-defeating.
One who accepts both naturalism and evolution has a “defeater” for their belief that human
belief-producing mechanisms, so evolved, are reliable. This defeater, however constitutes a
defeater for any belief produced by those mechanisms, including the beliefs which comprise
naturalism and evolution. Therefore, despite the fact that metaphysical naturalism and evolution
are typically thought of as very closely and comfortably connected, taken together, their
conjunction cannot rationally be held. If this argument is correct, then some variety of
supernaturalism must be true.
Misunderstandings of this argument abound, so some clarifications are important. First,
Plantinga’s argument should not be mistaken for an argument against contemporary evolutionary
theory by itself, but rather against unguided evolution; it is the conjunction of naturalism and
evolution that is in the crosshairs of Plantinga’s argument. Second, Plantinga’s argument in no
way suggests that human belief-forming mechanisms are actually unreliable, but rather that the
Alvin Plantinga, “Sheehen’s Shenanigans: How Theology Becomes Tomfoolery,” in The Analytic Theist, ed.
James Sennett (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998) 326. Originally published in the Reformed Journal 37 (April 1987)
19-25.
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naturalist is not justified in believing them to be reliable given the epistemological implications
of their metaphysical commitments. Finally, Plantinga’s proposed defeater for the naturalist’s
belief that their belief-producing mechanisms are reliable is of a special sort; it is a purely alethic
defeater. A purely alethic rationality defeater specifies that the reasons a person might have for
sustaining belief in cognitive reliability (and dismissing defeaters for that belief) must be
“successfully aimed at truth (i.e., at the maximization of true belief and the minimization of false
belief) and nothing more.”41
Recently, Plantinga has engaged the broader apologetic question of whether there is a
genuine conflict between Christianity and science, as commonly advanced by detractors of the
Christian faith. In his Where the Conflict really Lies (2011), he argues: “There is superficial
conflict, but deep concord between science and theistic religion, but superficial concord but deep
conflict between science and naturalism.”42 The alleged conflicts between Christianity and
science are either specious or superficial. Examples of specious conflict are the supposed conflict
between Christianity and evolution and between Christian accounts of divine action only and
science. The former only becomes a conflict if it is assumed that Scripture teaches that the earth
is very young and the latter only becomes a genuine conflict if it is assumed that nature is a
closed system of cause and effect. Moreover, the alleged conflict between the disciplines of
evolutionary psychology and historical biblical criticism, while real, are only superficial — that
is, they do not necessarily give Christians a defeater for the core beliefs of the faith. Not only is
there at best superficial conflict between Christianity and science, Plantinga finds deep concord
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between the two. He describes a number of ways in which human cognitive faculties match the
world — an adequatio intellectus ad rem, as the medievals termed it — and that this match
allows us to know things about the world. This match is perfectly sensible given the Christian
belief in human beings created in God’s image, but can only be regarded as blind luck given
naturalism. From this, Plantinga urges that “it is theism, not naturalism, that deserves to be called
‘the scientific worldview’.”43 Finally, not only is there greater concord between theism and
science than between naturalism and science, there is deep conflict between naturalism and
science, a conflict that can be seen in the fact that the conjunction of naturalism and evolution is
self-defeating — a conclusion demonstrated by his Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism.
Systemic and Personal Contributions
The final apologetic contribution to be discussed is of a different sort. As significant as
the apologetic impact of Plantinga’s various works has been, it can be argued that the whole of
his impact has been greater than the sum of its parts. Plantinga did not just defend the Christian
faith, he fundamentally changed the climate in academia with respect to belief in God and
philosophy of religion. His willingness to talk about God himself, rather than just God-talk; his
positive and substantive engagement with robust Christian faith, not just a watered- down or
academically palatable version of Christian belief; and his encouragement that Christians in the
academic world should work unapologetically as Christians, rather than only addressing subjects
that the broader academic community found important or interesting, have all been gamechangers. Speaking to Plantinga’s influence, Kelly James Clark says: “In the 1950’s there was
not a single published defense of religious belief by a prominent philosopher; by the 1990’s there
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were literally hundreds of books and articles, from Yale to UCLA and from Oxford to
Heidelberg, defending and developing the spiritual dimension. The difference between 1950 and
1990 is, quite simply, Alvin Plantinga.”44 Likewise, Yoram Hazony, president of the Herzl
Institute in Jerusalem said of Plantinga’s impact on academia: “Plantinga’s Christianity hit the
sleepy old atheism of the university philosophy departments like a tornado plowing into a
haystack. Belief in God became an open possibility again. All of us who’ve come after him are
in his debt.”45 Strikingly, the atheist philosopher Quentin Smith credits Plantinga’s God and
Other Minds with beginning the “unraveling of the secularization of mainstream academia.”46 He
says:
It became apparent to the philosophical profession that this book displayed that realist
theists were not outmatched by naturalists in terms of the most valued standards of
analytic philosophy: conceptual precision, rigor of argumentation, technical erudition,
and an in-depth defense of an original worldview. . . . This book, followed seven years
later by Plantinga’s even more impressive book, The Nature of Necessity, made it
manifest that a realist theist was writing at the highest qualitative level of analytic
philosophy.47
Of course, Plantinga had help in changing the culture in Christian philosophy. Nicholas
Wolterstorff, William Alston, Eleonore Stump, and others, joined him in starting the Society of
Christian Philosophers and many other younger scholars have taken Plantinga’s advice to heart
and propelled the movement forward, but it is difficult to see how all of that happens in the
absence of Plantinga’s work and influence. Justifiably, as a recognition of his influence,
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Plantinga was given the 2017 Templeton Prize.
Plantinga’s influence has also been manifest in a more personal way. He has intentionally
taken an active interest in and encouraged an entire generation of younger scholars. Plantinga
says:
It is . . . hard to think of any task more important, for a Christian philosopher, than doing
what one can to train and equip the next generation of Christian philosophers. This means
seeing younger philosophers, fledgling philosophers and graduate students as of immense
value. Their well-being and development as members of the community of Christian
philosophers is a source of real concern: it requires our best efforts and any
encouragement and help we can give. For it is they, after all, who will carry on this task
of Christian philosophy after the current generation has left the scene.48
Because this aspect of Plantinga’s influence has been deeply personal, it is fitting to close
this essay on a more personal note. There is no more influential figure on my faith and academic
development than Al Plantinga. Not only was his work profoundly instrumental in transforming
the way a rebellious college student in the middle of a faith crisis looked at the life of the mind
and belief in God, he has consistently gone above and beyond in encouraging my academic
work, and this despite the fact that I was never formally his student. This included writing an
encouraging three page, single-spaced letter giving advice to a philosophical neophyte who had
just recovered from a faith crisis, numerous life-shaping philosophical and personal
conversations during disc golf matches, and collaborating on academic projects. If I am now in a
place where I can encourage the next generation, it is because of Al’s investment in my academic
career. And stories like these are legion. Not only is Plantinga’s apologetic contribution
unparalleled in the contemporary world, but the way he has lived has itself been an apologetic
for the faith his work has defended.49
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